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Nation-states form from the unification of disparate groups which
feel such a configuration maximizes the protection of their values.
Once formed, however, the state exists in dialectic opposition to fur-
ther group formation, governing elites jealously preserving their ex-
istence against the formation of groups which do not find the state
supportive of their needs. Usually some accommodation is reached,
but at times dissident communities demand independence or some
other status which the governing elite refuses to recognize. Such de-
mands are frequently articulated under the rubric of self-determination
and raise issues of human rights which cannot be ignored.
Self-determination has not, however, traditionally been defined in
this manner. Historically, international law allowed state elites to
treat citizens as they saw fit. But in an interdependent world, this
view has become anachronistic. There is a growing auareness that
any state activity that deprives a segment of its population of its
human rights is a matter of international concern.1 Even where no
danger of international conflict exists, ignoring one national sub-
group's brutality toward another offends basic ideas of civilization.
The crematoria of Auschwitz stand as a vivid reminder of the end
result of ignoring a state's actions within its own borders.
At the turn of this century, the term self-determination had some
symbolic importance but lacked normative content. However, as dif-
ferent groups began utilizing the symbol of self-determination, the
world community evolved prescriptions to deal with these growing
demands.2 As new and different demands were made, some prescrip-
tions were terminated while others, taking account of changing ex-
pectations, came to the fore.3 These new prescriptions have con-
1. For an early exposition of this concept, see H. LAuTERI'AcHT, INTERNATIoNAL LAW
AND HUmAN RIGHTS 178 (1950). See also E. Lauterpacht, Some Concepts of Human Rights,
11 How. L.J. 264 (1965); M. MosKowrrz, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHrTS
(1968); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and TWorld Public Order: A Frame-
work For Policy Oriented Inquiry, 63 At. J. INL L. 237 (1969).
2. The term prescription in this context refers to a set of expectations about who is
the appropriate decision-maker in a specific class of controversies, how that decision-
maker will deal with such controversies, and what criteria will affect his decisions.
3. For a discussion of the dynamics of the decision-making process in the international
context, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constiluti'e Process of Authori-
tative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 403, 423 (1967); M. McDOUGAL, H. Ls aELL & I.
VLAsic, LAW AND PUBLIC ORmE IN SPACE Part I (1963). An authoritative decision involves
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sistently expanded the groups to which the principle of self-deter-
mination applies. However, with equal consistency other groups
have opposed this extension and have sought to limit the concept of
self-determination to situations which least threaten the status quo.
Since 1945 this evolutionary process has occurred primarily in the
General Assembly of the United Nations, the most representative
body of the organized world community.
This Note has two related themes. The first is that the General
Assembly has assumed an authoritative role in determining the con-
tent of the principle of self-determination. The South West Africa
issue presents an excellent opportunity to examine this assertion.
First at Versailles, then in Geneva, and now in New York, the status
of the people of South West Africa has been a subject of almost con-
tinuous debate and of six separate Judgments and Advisory Opinions
of the International Court of Justice. It thus offers an excellent op-
portunity to examine the role of the organized world community,
in its different forms, in evolving the right of self-determination.
A critical event in the South African controversy was the 1971 Ad-
visory Opinion of the International Court of Justice: 4 The court
there recognized that the primary issue regarding South Africa's
continued presence in Namibia5 was its refusal to allow the Namibians
the right to determine their own future, a right established by the
General Assembly in its debates and resolutions. The court af-
firmed the inclusive role of the Assembly in determining the nor-
mative content of this right. In this sense, the Opinion represents
the culmination of the anti-colonialist era, providing judicial recog-
nition to the right of former colonies to independence.
The second theme is that the General Assembly has thus far been
unwilling to expand the concept of self-determination beyond the
colonial context. This Note will argue that in its broad meaning,
self-determination must be viewed as the basic right of the indi-
vidual to form his own associations in order to maximize his pre-
ferred interests. If it recognizes this interpretation the Assembly will
a complex of activities including intelligence gathering, recommendations of policy, pre-
scription of the policy as authoritative, invocation of dccision-makers when there are
deviations from prescriptions, application of these prescriptions to such behavior, termi-
nation of outmoded prescriptions, and an appraisal of the effects of a flow of decisions.
4. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Reso-
lution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16 [hereinafter cited as Namibia].
5. The General Assembly changed the name of the territory of South West Africa to
Namibia, the name given to the land by the insurgent groups operating against the
South Africans. GA. Res. 2372, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6176/Add. 1
(1968).
534
Vol. 82: 533, 197.3
The United Nations and the Namibia Opinions
then be able to focus on human rights problems and contribute to
their solution.
I. Evolution of the Principle of Self-Determination by the Organized
World Community
A. The Mandate System: Sacred Trust of Civilization
During the First World War, the Allies adopted self-determination
as one of the major principles at stake in the struggle.0 President
Wilson maintained that the principle was a necessary precondition
for international peace. However, he limited application of the prin-
ciple to Central and Eastern Europe and was willing to sacrifice it
even there if other interests seemed more important.7 The other
powers had little sympathy for even Wilson's limited concept of self-
determination, and the resulting peace treaties reflected the cynicism
of those participants. At most, the treaties expressed a willingness to
establish several new European states in order to secure a new balance
of power.8 As for the overseas possessions of the defeated powers, the
victors developed a plan which offered the people of those colonies
not immediate self-determination but rather subjugation to a Man-
date system. Although the countries chosen as Mandatories and given
control over the former colonies could derive substantial benefits
from the arrangement, they did have certain obligations to the in-
digenous populations. These were embodied in the concept of the
"sacred trust of civilization."
The sacred trust concept was articulated in Article 22 of the League
of Nations Covenant:
1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of
the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peo-
ples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous con-
ditions of the modem world, there should be applied the principle
6. The roots of the doctrine can be found in the aftermath of the religious wars of
the seventeenth century, but the principle received its first modem expression during
the American and French Revolutions. Sinha, Selj-Deterinination in International Law
and its Applicability to the Baltic Peoples, in REs BALTIcA 256, 257-62 (A. Sprudzs & A.
Rusis eds. 1968). For the history of self-determination, see E. CARR, THE F TURE OF NA-
TIONS: INDEPENDENCE OR INTERDEPENDENCE (1941); A. ConDAN, ThE NATION STArE A .D NA-
TIONAL SELF DETERMINATION (1970); U. U.mozuRiKE, SELF.DETmUsINATION IN INTENATIONAL
Law ch. 1 (1972); S. WVAMBAUGH, PLEBSCrES SINCE THE WORLD WAR (1933).
7. U. UmozuRKE, supra note 6, at 11-26; A. ConBAN, supra note 6, at 62-66.
8. Brown, Self-Determination in Central Europe, 14 A?. J. Ir'L L. 235, 237 (1920).
The Yale Law Journal
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred
trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this
trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle
is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to ad-
vanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience
or their geographical position can best undertake this responsi-
bility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage
should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the
League.9
The International Court has grappled with the meaning of these
provisions on six separate occasions, each time in the context of the
South West Africa Mandate. 10 One of the major questions presented
in these cases has been whether the organized world community, what-
ever its form, could supervise the conduct of the Mandates, or whether
such supervision could be exercised only by the League of Nations.
Only in its Judgment of 19661" did the court reject the contention
that the sacred trust gives members of the organized world community
a continuing legal interest in the conduct of the Mandates. After six
years of litigation,' 2 an 8-7 majority held that it would not entertain
a dispute between former members of the League and South Africa,
the Mandatory power, over the latter's treatment of the inhabitants
of the Mandate, because the petitioner states had no standing to raise
the issue.'8 The court stressed that though
9. LEAGUE OF NATioNs COVENANT art. 22, paras. 1 & 2.
10. During the 1950's the Court issued three Advisory Opinions: Advisory Opinion on
International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128 [hereinafter cited as Inter-
national Status Opinion] (see pp. 538-40 infra); Advisory Opinion on South West Africa
-Voting Procedure, [1955] I.C.J. 67 [hereinafter cited as Voting Procedures Opinion]
(see p. 547 infra); Advisory Opinion on the Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners
by the Committee on South West Africa, [1956] I.C.J. 23 [hereinafter cited as Petitioners
Opinion] (see p. 547 infra). All three stressed the role of the General Assembly as
supervisor of the Mandate. In 1960, Liberia and Ethiopia, former members of the League
and present members of the United Nations, brought contentious proceedings against
South Africa for violations of the Mandate. The court dealt with this litigation In two
phases. See notes 11-13 infra. Finally, in 1970 the Security Council asked for an Advisory
Opinion on the consequences for States of the termination of the Mandate, The result
was the Namibia Opinion, which sought to draw conclusions concerning the right to self-
determination and the role of the General Assembly in defining and protecting that right.
See pp. 543-46 et seq. infra.
11. South West Africa Second Phase, Judgment, [1966] I.C.J. 6 [hereinafter cited as
1966 SWA Judgment].
12. South West Africa Cases Preliminary Objections, [1962] I.C.J. 319 [hereinafter
cited as 1962 SWA Judgment].
13. 1966 SWA Judgment. The decision took much of the international community by
surprise because it seemed to reverse the 1962 ruling and came after months devoted to
oral and written pleadings directed solely to the merits. Six of the fourteen judges did in
fact examine the compatibility of apartheid with the Mandatory's obligations to promote
the welfare of the inhabitants, and only South Africa's judge ad hoc, Van Wyk, found
for South Africa. Id. at 140-93 (Van Wyk, J.), 235 (Wellington Koo, J.), 315 (Tanaka, J.),
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humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis
for rules of law .... [s]uch considerations do not, however, in
themselves amount to rules of law . . . . [T]he existence of an
"interest" does not of itself entail that this interest is specifically
juridical in character.'
4
There is no doubt that humanitarian considerations gave the im-
petus for establishing the Mandates. Lord McNair has written:
There was perhaps no part of the Covenant that called forth
more derision from the cynical and worldly-wise than the Man-
dates System contained in Article XXII. . . . The Mandates
System represents the irruption of the idealist into one of the
periodical world settlements which have in the past lain too
much in the hands of "practical men.'la
The majority of the 1966 court failed to consider the community poli-
cies underlying the sacred trust concept, and this failure to adopt a con-
textual approach with policy considerations led them to ignore the
crucial role that the organized world community was expected to
play. While there is no doubt that in 1919, as now, traditional inter-
national law was primarily a jus inter potestas, a law between states,
events have caused radical changes in the world order. Judge Jessup
has noted four major post-World War I manifestations of the recog-
nition that all states have an interest in events occurring in any part
of the world:'0 Article 11 of the League Covenant, which recognized
that peace is indivisible;' 7 treaty recognition of the interest of the
464 (Padilla Nervo, J.), 482-83 (Forster, J.), 490 (Mbanefo, judge ad hoc). Judge Spender
criticized discussion on the merits in an attached Declaration. Id. at 51-57. For criticisms
of the Judgment, see Higgins, The International Court and South West Africa: The Im.
plications of the Judgment, 42 INT'L AFF. 573 (1966); Gross, The South W'est Africa Case:
What Happened?, 45 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 36 (1966-67); Dugard, The South West Africa Case
Second Phase, 1966, 83 SouTm AFRIcAN L.J. 429 (1966).
14. 1966 SIVA Judgment at 34. The court also observed:
The sacred trust, it is said, is a "sacred trust of civilization." Hence all civilized na-
tions have an interest in seeing that it is carried out. An interest no doubt; but in
order that this interest may take on a specifically legal character, the sacred trust
itself must be or become something more than a moral or humanitarian ideal ....
Id. In a recent article, Alexandrowicz claims that the juridical expression of the sacred trust
concept can be found in nineteenth century bilateral treaties between European powers
and African nations, and in the multilateral arrangements made at the Berlin Con-
ference of 1884-85. He finds that the establishment of the sacred trust is connected with
the transfer by the African tribes of their sovereignty, territory, and destiny to the Euro-
pean colonialists. Through various transactions these European states assumed the role
of guardian of the African communities. Alexandrowicz. The Sole Juridical Expression of
the Sacred Trust of Civilization, 65 Am. J. IN'L L. 149 (1971).
15. McNair, Preface to J. SToYA ovs y, TiE MANDATE FOR PALESNINE at v (1928). For
a collection of the views of other scholars, see 1966 SIVA Judgment at 373-38 (Jessup, J.,
dissenting).
16. 1962 SIVA Judgment at 425-33 (Jessup, J.).
17. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 11.
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international community in the protection of minorities;1 8 the in-
terest of every state in the "humane conditions of labour" in all states,
as propounded in the Constitution of the International Labor Or-
ganization; 1 and, finally, Article 22 of the Covenant with its formu-
lation of the sacred trust.20
The Mandate System instituted a novel regime with at least three
important legal consequences. First, the principle of non-annexation
was recognized as paramount.21 That is, normal rules concerning the
acquisition and loss of territory did not apply to the Mandates. Second,
Article 7 of the Mandate Agreements22 imposed a legal obligation
on the Mandatories, including South Africa, to submit reports to the
League, thereby conferring on the organized world community a voice
in determining the rights and duties of the Mandatory with regard
to the territory under its control. Finally, Article 22 of the League
Covenant, in describing the Mandate Agreements, explicitly pro-
claims concern for the peoples of the territories, thus giving them
a special status. 23 The result of these novel provisions was to create
two new legal persons in international law-the international organi-
zation and the individual. These provisions thus served to shift the
international perspective on territories under foreign domination
from a concept of sovereignty to one of supervision by the organized
world community.
This supervisory role was made explicit in the court's 1950 Opin-
ion.24 The judges there agreed that the Mandate survived the dis-
solution of the League:
18. Article 69 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which terminated hostilities between the
Allies and Austria after World War I, was the prototype for other minority treaties:
"Austria agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles of this Section, so far as
they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obli-
gations of international concern ...... 3 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY,
1648-1967, at 1562 (F. Israel ed. 1967).
19. I.L.O. CONST. preamble & art. 26.
20. See pp. 535-36 supra.
21. In its Advisory Opinion of 1950 the Court recalled that when the nations set up
the Mandate system,
two principles were considered to be of paramount importance: the principle of
nonannexation and the principle that the well-being and development of such
peoples form a "sacred trust of civilization."
International Status Opinion at 131.
22. 1 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 60 (1931).
23. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1. See Oral Statement of The Nether-
lands, 2 Namibia Opinion, I.C.J. pleadings 122-23 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Namnibia
Pleadings].
24. International Status Opinion. This decision was foreshadowed by the dissent of
Judge Oda in the Mavrommatis case, dealing with the Mandate for Palestine. Judge Oda
declared that provisions for the indirect supervision of the Mandate by the Permanent
Court could only be initiated at the request of a member of the League, and that such
an application "must be made exclusively with a view to the protection of general inter-
ests." Thus an outside state could, through the Permanent Court, intervene to assert the
interest of the world community in the supervision of the sacred trust. The Mlavrommatls
Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), [1924] P. C. I. J. ser. A, No. 2, 7, at 85.
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The object of the Mandate regulated by international rules far
exceeded that of contractual relations regulated by national law.
The Mandate was created in the interest of the inhabitants of
the territory and of humanity in general, as an international in-
stitution with an international object-a sacred trust of civili-
zation.2 5
Thus the reasons for establishing the Mandate gave it a status which
had not lapsed. As the Namibia court later observed, "an institution
established for the fulfillment of a sacred trust cannot be presumed
to lapse before the achievement of its purpose." 20 The 1950 Opinion
went still further, stating that the supervisory role of the organized
world community also survived in the form of obligations owed to
the General Assembly, since that body performed many of the func-
tions of the old League Council. Specifically, the majority found
that Article 80 (1) of the United Nations Charter maintained the
obligations of the Mandatory, while Article 10 created the supervisory
power of the Assembly.
2 7
The dissenters from this portion of the Opinion found no legal
nexus between the survival of the Mandate and the necessity to re-
port to the Assembly, because they overlooked the importance of
the sacred trust.28 At the core of the 1950 Opinion is the assertion
that the sacred trust is a dynamic concept not limited by any agree-
ment but rather dedicated to the well-being of the inhabitants of
25. International Status Opinion at 132. The court reasoned that the obligations of
South Africa to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social
progress of the inhabitants under Articles 2-5 of the Mandate Agreement represented the
very essence of the sacred trust," and, since their fulfillment did not depend on the exist-
ence of the League, "they could not be brought to an end merely because this superisory
organ ceased to exist." Id. at 133. Judges Read and McNair agreed that the Mandates
survived the dissolution of the League. Id. at 169 (Read, J.), 157 (McNair. J.).
26. Namibia at 32.
27. International Status Opinion at 136-37. This holding was specifically approved
by the court in its 1971 Advisory Opinion, Namibia at 33-37.
28. International Status Opinion at 146-92. Actually, Justice McNair did realize its
significance:
The Mandates System is a new institution-a new relationship between a territory
and its inhabitants on the one hand and the government which represents them
internationally on the other-a new species of international government, which does
not fit into the old conception and which is alien to it. The doctrine of sovereignty
has no application to this new system. Sovereignty over a Mandated territory is in
abeyance; if and when the inhabitants of the territory obtain recognition as an inde-
pendent State... sovereignty will revive and vest in the new State.
Id. at 150 (McNair, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Despite this statement. McNair was
not willing to preserve the administrative supervisory function of the organized world
community. He believed that the Mandate System provided for both judicial and ad-
ministrative supervision, and, since former members of the League still had a legal in-
terest in the proper exercise of the Mandate and could bring to the ICJ any violations
committed by the Mandatory, this was sufficient protection. One wonders how he would
have voted had he foreseen the 1966 Judgment, which denied this type of judicial super-
vision.
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the Mandated territories. A later court expressly interpreted the
1950 Opinion in this manner:
[T]he paramount purpose underlying the taking over by the
General Assembly of the UN of the supervisory functions in re-
spect of the Mandate for South West Africa . . . was to safeguard
the sacred trust of civilization through the maintenance of ef-
fective international supervision of the administration of the
Mandated Territory.
29
The International Court's prescription of the supervisory powers
of the organized world community did not take place in a vacuum,
but rather during a time of intense international concern over prob-
lems of political and cultural independence. The court was attempt-
ing to express a new view of the sacred trust consistent with the
evolving shared expectations of the international community. To
understand the significance of these Opinions, one must view them
in this context of world events.
B. The Modern Expression of Self-Determination in the General
Assembly
Article 73 of the U.N. Charter expands the concept of the sacred
trust to all "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government . . . ."30 The principle of self-determination
appears as one of the "purposes" of the United Nations in Article
1(2) and is again mentioned in Article 55.31 Though these provisions
expressed the hopes, more than the political realities, of the world
in 1945, they represented the genesis of a new legal concept. The
birth of the new nation-states of the Third World and their entry
into the United Nations led to the drive against colonialism in the
post-war decade. In the U.N., these new members consistently sup-
ported revolutionary movements which were rapidly driving out the co-
lonial powers. At first, several Western states ignored these demands for
29. Petitioners Opinion at 28.
30. U.N. CARTER art. 73. See Namibia at 31.
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 and art. 55. For the history of these Articles,
see R. RUSSELL, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (1958); L. GooDRct, E.
HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS
30 (3d and rev. ed. 1969) (Article 1). On the role of self-determination in the post World
War II period, see A. COBBAN, supra note 6; Emerson, The New Higher Law of Anti-
Colonialism, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (1. Deutsch & S. Hoffman
eds. 1968); Mensah, Self-Determination Under United Nations Auspices (1964) (unpub.
lished doctoral dissertation, Yale University). For a more cynical look at the events of
the past few years, see Emerson, Self-Determination, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971).
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independence. To keep such sensitive matters out of U.N. debate
and public view, these nations relied on the protection of Article
2(7) of the Charter, which reserved to the states matters essentially
within their domestic jurisdiction. 32 Most members, however, refused
to recognize any limitation on the ability of the Assembly to discuss
problems of colonialism.
33
From a legal standpoint, the most important event in the fight
against colonial rule was the adoption in 1960 of tie Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.34
This Declaration, Resolution 1514(XV), embraces all peoples and
territories which have not yet attained independence. It broke with
past tradition by stating that lack of preparation in the political,
economic, social, or educational fields could no longer "serve as a
pretext for delaying independence." 33 It has carried more weight
than the usual Assembly recommendation and is the basis for most
later pronouncements on self-determination.30 The Declaration also
reflects the peculiar circumstances of colonialism. While the ideal
of self-determination at Versailles was to grant independence to sepa-
rate ethnic communities on the basis of common languages or cul-
tures, in the decolonization era ethnicity is irrelevant; the main con-
sideration is the political boundaries of the former colonial territories.
Indeed, to ensure national stability in an essentially fragmented en-
vironment, the new elites of Africa have had to deny the right of
32. U.N. CHAmT art. 2, para. 7.
33. Thus, although France claimed that since Algeria was part of Metropolitan France
the United Nations had no right to interfere, an overwhelming majority in the Assembly
voted to recognize the right of the Algerian people to independence. G.A. Res. 1573, 15
U.N. GAOR Supp. 16 at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4660 (1960). For a review of the attempts to
invoke Art. 2(7) in the Assembly to avoid debate on issues of self-determination and the
refusal of that organ to accept such an argument, see R. HIGGINS, TIlE DEvnorsEl, T OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF TIlE UNITED NATIONS 91-106 (1963).
34. GA. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A14684 (1960) [herein-
after cited as Res. 1514(XV)]. See Namibia at 31.
35. Res. 1514(XV) at 67.
36. At its next session the General Assembly set up a committee to make recommenda-
tions on the implementation of Res. 1514(XV) and to propose specific measures to speed
up the process. GA. Res. 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 65. U.N. Doc. A15100 (1962).
See also GA Resolutions 1810, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 72. U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962);
1956, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); 1970, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp.
15, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); 2105, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14. at 3. U.N. Doe. A16U14
(1965); 2189, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 2326, 22 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 16, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); 2465, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18. at 4. U.N. Doe.
A/7218 (1968); 2548, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 5, U.N. Doe. A/763U (1969); 2621, 25 UN.
GAOR Supp. 28, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). For a review of the Assembly's handling of
the Algerian, Cyprus, and West Irian questions in light of the Declaration, see L. GooD-
RICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 31, at 32-33. Even those who looked warily at
the Declaration because of its lack of specific content noted that it could not be ignored
and would have significant ramifications on other areas of customary international law.
R. JENNINGS, THE AcquisrrIoN OF TERRITORY 78-87 (1963).
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secession based on cultural differences, which was the essence of
Wilsonian self-determination. Thus, one provision of Res. 1514 (XV)
asserts that the integrity of a state's national territory shall be
respected.
87
After the passage of Res. 1514(XV), the increasing voting power
of the Third World states in the U.N. and their growing impatience
with the refusal of the Western powers to eradicate colonialism led
to demands for further recognition of the right to aid oppressed peo-
ples. Thus, General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) on noninterven-
tion, which forbids not only military, but economic, political, or any
other type of pressure to coerce another state as well, makes the one
exception that,
All States shall respect the right of self-determination and in-
dependence of peoples and nations ...with absolute respect to
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Consequently all States
shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimi-
nation and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.
88
With this resolution, passed by a vote of 109-0, the representatives
warned those who oppressed their populations that other states might
intervene to correct the situation. Similarly, in 1966 the Assembly
adopted the International Covenants On Human Rights, which
declare that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
Thus, in the 1960's the actions of the General Assembly not only re-
flected an awareness of the changing political realities, but also "sym-
bolize[d] and concretize[d] a new politico-juridical conception: the
37. Res. 1514(XV) at 67.
38. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). This'
Resolution has been criticized in Dugard, The Organization of African Unity and
Colonialism: An Enquiry into the Plea of Self-Defence As a Justification For the Use of
Force In the Eradication of Colonialism, 16 INT'L & Cora. L.Q. 157 (1967). Bt see
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), stressing the duty of
states to refrain from any forcible action which might deprive peoples of their right to
self-determination and entitling governments to support those peoples seeking to exercise
this right. This Declaration expresses the Third World and Communist view of the right to
use force to liberate peoples under colonial domination. For more on the problem of
the use of force, see note 61 infra.
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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definite repudiation and end of colonialism." 40 The history of the
former Mandates reflects this change: Excluding Namibia, only two
of fifteen remain under United Nations tutelage.
41
The development of the right of self-determination has occurred
during a period of growing concern for human rights in general and
should be viewed as a reflection of this concern. The Preamble of the
U.N. Charter -4 2 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,4 3 the
Genocide Convention, 44 the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 45 and the two Covenants on Human Rights40 repre-
sent but a few of the major documents reflecting this concern. Simi-
larly, during its debates over Rhodesia, the Security Council estab-
lished a nexus between the deprivation of human rights and threats
to international peace, thus invoking its competence to declare vio-
lations of such rights.
47
C. The Namibia Opinion: From Sacred Trust to Self-Determ.nation
In 1971, the International Court affirmed the right of colonial
peoples to independence. The immediate history of the Opinion
began when the Twenty-First Session of the General Assembly con-
vened in the fall of 1966, a few months after the ICJ had rendered
its Judgment in the South West Africa Cases.48 The Assembly, re-
acting to what seemed an abdication of responsibility on the part of
the court,49 passed Res. 2145(XXI), in which it declared:
That South Africa has failed to fulfill its obligations in respect
of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure
the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous
inhabitants of South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed
the Mandate.
[A]nd therefore ... that the Mandate conferred upon his Brit-
40. J. CASrANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS 175 (1969). A minority of com-
mentators still hold that "the principle of national self.determination is a formative
principle, but not yet part and parcel of international customary law." See, e.g., G.
SCHwARTZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 74 (5Lth ed. 1957).
41. In part, the decolonization process was hastened by the awareness of several of
the Western powers that they could surrender political control over these territories
while maintaining economic domination.
42. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
43. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc, A/810 at 71 (1948).
44. Adopted by GA. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 174 (1948).
45. Adopted by G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
46. See p. 542 and note 39 supra.
47. See McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 Ast. J. Irrr'L L. 1, 13-19 (1968).
48. See pp. 536-37 supra.
49. See p. 554 infra.
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tanic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of
the Union of South Africa is therefore terminated, that South
Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that
henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibil-
ity of the United Nations.50
South Africa ignored the resolution and instituted a course of ac-
tion designed to annex the territory. The Praetoria Government ar-
rested and tried over thirty Namibian political leaders, an act which
the Assembly and Security Council viewed as a direct violation of
Res. 2145(XXI), since the termination of the Mandate meant that
South Africa no longer had authority within the territory.5' South
Africa then began implementing the Odendaal plan to establish "home-
lands" for the black and colored populations in the barren parts of
Namibia.5 2 The Security Council responded by passing Res. 276 (1970),
which declared,
that the continued presence of South African authorities in
Namibia is illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the
Government of South Africa on behalf or concerning Namibia
after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid ....
and called,
upon all States, particularly those which have economic and
other interests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with
the Government of South Africa which are inconsistent with
. . . the present resolution.53
At its next session, the Security Council asked the International
Court for an Advisory Opinion on the consequences of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia. 54 The court, however, devoted
50. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
51. See S.C. Resolutions 245, 246, 23 U.N. SCOR, 1387th meeting 1, 2 (1968); GA. Res.
2324, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2325, 22 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
52. U. UMOZURIKE, supra note 6, at 133-37.
53. S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1529th meeting 1 (1970). The delegates viewed this
resolution as a compromise which could give the United Nations a productive role with-
out splitting the membership over the question of the use of force against South Africa.
See note 61 infra.
54. S.C. Res. 284, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 4 (1970). The strange wording of
the request resulted from the fear that if the judges were allowed to rule on the validity
of the termination of the Mandate they might consider Res. 2145(XXI) and Res. 276
(1970) ultra vires; the bitter taste of the 1966 Judgment still lingered. For the court's
reply, see Namibia at 45.
The court held by 13 votes to 2:
1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South
Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immedi-
ately and thus put an end to its occupation of the territory;
by 11 votes to 4,
2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the
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most of the substantive part of the Opinion to a review of the events
precipitating the revocation of the Mandate. The Council had not
requested such a review nor did the court add any new information
to that contained in its previous Opinions. Rather, the judges em-
barked on this historical survey, stressing the uniqueness of the
sacred trust concept, the emergence of the United Nations, and the
significance of pronouncements such as Res. 1514 (XV), in order to
provide a basis for the Assembly's revocation: its authority to apply
the right of self-determination to particular situations. The court
made it clear that by 1966, the year of the revocation, the evolving
sacred trust concept required granting of the right of self-determina-
tion to the Namibian people:
Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an
instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at
the time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into ac-
count the fact that the concepts embodied in Art. 22 of the
Covenant... were not static, but were by definition evolutionary,
as also therefore, was the concept of the "sacred trust". . . . [I]ts
interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent de-
velopment of law, through the Charter of the United Nations
and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international instru-
ment has to be interpreted and applied within the framework
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpre-
tation. In the domain to which the present proceedings relate,
the last fifty years . . . have brought important developments.
illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on
behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular
any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the
legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration;
3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations
to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph 2 above, in the action which
has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia.
Namibia at 58.
The case has many procedural pathologies, the worst being the refusal to seat an ad
hoc judge from South Africa and the refusal of some of the members of the court to
step down because they had taken part in events critical to the determination of the
court. These decisions, which would not have affected the outcome, represented serious
tactical blunders. As Judge Onyeama put it in his Separate Opinion, South Africa's re-
quests should have prevailed "so that justice may not only be done but manifestly be
seen to be done." Id. at 140. With a member of the court of their own choosing to
represent their point of view to the rest of the judges, South Africa would have found it
harder to ignore the Opinion, particularly since the appointment of an ad hoc judge
would have drawn the case closer to contentious proceedings which are binding on the
participants. On the question of the ad hoc judge, see id. at 152-53 (Dillard, J.), 139-41
(Onyeama, J.), 308-17 (Fitzmaurice, J.), 324-31 (Gros, J., dissenting). See also Gordon, Old
Orthodoxies Amid New Experiences: The South West Africa (Namibia) Litigation and
the Uncertain Jurisprudence of the International Court of justice, I DL. vi J. IN' L
& PoLicY 65, 86-87 (1971). For the reaction of South African leaders to the Opinion, see
Dugard, The Opinions on South West Africa (Namibia): The Teleologists Triumph, 83
SouTm Arac& L.J. 460 (1971).
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These developments leave little doubt that the ultimate objec-
tive of the sacred trust was the self-determination and inde-
pendence of the peoples concerned. In this domain, as elsewhere,
the corpus juris gentium has been considerably enriched, and this
the Court, if it is faithfully to discharge its function, may not
ignore. 55
Viewed in this light, the other Opinions of the court concerning
South West Africa become clear. With the exception of the 1966
Judgment,5" all concern themselves with the ability of the General
Assembly to supervise South Africa's administration of the territory.
In 1950, the court decided the central question in the Assembly's
55. Namibia at 31-32 (emphasis added). This approach to treaty interpretation is
compatible with Art. 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.
Whether one uses a contextual approach or stresses the intentions of the parties, the
function of any applier is to secure a set of results which contributes to the major goals
of the entire system of which the applier is a part. As Reisman notes:
[W]here interpretation is recognized as a broad contextual function, the judge or
any other applier seised of the case becomes a dominant participant in the decision.
Where a constricted notion of interpretation reigns, the immediate applier's creativity
is limited, but the initial prescriber's intentions are not necessarily maximized, for
the application of a prescription without a creative mind able to fashion it to fit
the needs of the current context vouchsafes at best accidental conformity with the
ratio legis.
W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REvisiON: THE REvIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUDCMENTS AND AWARDS 195 (1970). This is especially so when events subsequent to the
agreement so change the circumstances surrounding it as to make attempts to recapture
the original expectations of the parties impossible. These changes impose a shift "from
a textual analysis to one which stresses the obligations and purposes of the engagement
in the light of the total context in which the engagement was located." Namibia at 157
(Dillard, J.). See Dugard, supra note 43, and Dugard, Namibia (South West Africa): The
Court's Opinion, South Africa's Response, and Prospects for the Future, 11 COLUM. J. OF
TRANSNAT'L L. 14 (1972), attempting to explain this approach to the South Africans,
who are extreme textualists.
56. The 1966 majority used a strict textual approach to avoid reaching the merits:
[The Court] must place itself at the point in time when the mandates system was
being instituted, and when the instruments of the mandate were being framed. The
Court must have regard to the situation as it was at that time. . . . Intentions that
might have been formed if the Mandate had been framed at a much later date, and
in the knowledge of circumstances, such as the eventual dissolution of the League
and its aftermath ... are not relevant.
1966 SWA Judgment at 23. See also Namibia at 235, 241 (Fitzmanrice, J., dissenting). In tile
view of the majority of writers and of the legislative history of the Vienna Convention,
this approach to the interpretation of treaties must be rejected. See M. McDoUcAL, H.
LASSWELL & J. MILLER, INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER clh. 4
(1967), for a critique of the plain terms rule. See also A. MCNAIR, TitE LAW OF TREATIES
364-93 (1961); Statement of Sir Humphry Waldock explaining Art. 31 of the Vienna Con.
vention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Conference On the Law of Treaties, 1st sess., U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.39/l1, at 184 (1968). The court itself had rejected a rigid mode of inter-
preting the Mandate Agreement only four years earlier:
[T]his rule of interpretation is not an absolute one. Where such a method of Inter-
pretation results in a meaning incompatible with the spirit, purpose and context of
the clause or instrument in which the words are contained, no reliance can be validly
placed on it.
1962 SWA Judgment at 336.
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favor-that is, that it succeeded the League as supervisor of the
Mandates. To reach this conclusion, the court had to emphasize the
sacred trust concept, since there was no express succession provision
transferring these powers from the League to the U.N. The judges
could not, in 1950, rest the Assembly's power on its right to decide
questions of self-determination, because the Assembly had not yet
developed its competence in this area. There was, however, a suffi-
cient distrust of the continuance of the white man's burden for the
world community to demand a continuing voice in the administra-
tion of the territories.
In 1955, South Africa.objected that, contrary to the 1950 Opinion,
supervision by the Assembly was more onerous than that exercised
by the League Council. In the Council, the passage of a resolution
required a unanimous vote, whereas the Assembly requires at most
only two-thirds approval. However, the court brushed aside this con-
tention, holding that the 1950 Opinion dealt with the substantive
degree of supervision, whereas the voting provision related merely
to the procedures of the organization."-
The next year, in the Petitioners case, South Africa argued that
the 1950 Opinion was intended to limit the degree of supervi-
sion exercised by the General Assembly to that actually undertaken
by the League Council. The court rejected such a reading, finding
nothing in the Covenant, the Charter, or any other instrument to
so restrict the Assembly's authority. Nor could the court find any
justification for assuming that the transfer of the supervisory au-
thority formerly exercised by the League had the effect of crystallizing
the Mandates System at the point it had reached in 1946.08
Viewing these cases with the benefit of hindsight, one can see the
court grappling with the problem of preserving the power of the
Assembly, intuitively feeling that this body had the right to make
determinations concerning the Mandate. The court therefore avoid-
ed, as much as possible, a strict interpretation of the Mandate Agree-
ment which might have left South Africa free to annex Namibia.
57. Voting Procedures Opinion.
58. Petitioners Opinion at 29. In his Separate Opinion Judge Lauterpacht viewed the
degree of supervision in its entirety. He admitted that the procedure of oral hearings
"connotes in itself a degree of supervision of a stringency greater than that obtaining
in the matter of petitions under the Mandates System." However, he noted that as a
result of South Africa's refusal to submit reports, as required by the 1950 Opinion.
supervision was reduced in that respect. He therefore concluded that "the total effect will
not result in exceeding the degree of supervision as a whole." Id. at 45-46. Thus, Lauter-
pacht took account of an element not contemplated by the original parties in order to
make supervision effective in terms of modern expectations.
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Now that the court has given judicial recognition to the nexus
established by the General Assembly between the contemporary defi-
nition of self-determination and the inchoate sacred trust concept,
there is no longer any problem in justifying the actions of the As-
sembly. When South Africa signed the Mandate Agreement it de-
clared its willingness to participate in a process of international legis-
lation; it did not enter into a treaty whereby it relinquished part
of its sovereignty. While in agreements of this latter type derogations
from sovereignty are construed narrowly, with treaties of the former
type any solution must be compatible with the basic premises of
the agreement.59 Since no question of sovereignty intervenes, the
powers of the Mandatory and those of the supervisory authority are
limited to those which will achieve the ultimate goal of the Man-
date Agreement-formerly the fulfillment of the sacred trust, now
the granting of self-determination. Moreover, once the primacy of
this goal is recognized, it necessarily follows that territories such as
South West Africa come under international control, the modalities
of which are to be determined by the international community or-
ganized in the United Nations.
II. The Role of the General Assembly as Decision-maker
From where does the General Assembly derive its authority to
make dispositive statements on self-determination? The original
framers of the U.N. Charter gave most of the decision making au-
thority to the Security Council, ensuring the major powers a veto
in important issues. The Council has the competence to deal with
any issue of self-determination, based on its "primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security."00 For ex-
59. This analysis follows that used by the Netherlands, 2 Narnibia Pleadings at 125.30,
and may be illustrated by comparing the Mandate Agreements with the Advisory Opinion
on the Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950) LC.J. 229. In the Peace Treaties case the
court declined to hold that the failure of a state to appoint representatives to the Com-
missions which were provided for by the treaties for the settlement of disputes justified
an alternative method of appointment not contemplated by these treaties. In his opinion
interpreting the Mandate Agreement, Judge Lauterpacht explained the difference between
that result and the result when dealing with the Mandate as the absence of agreement
in the former to endow those treaties with total effectiveness. Petitioners Opinion at 58.
In oral pleadings before the Namibia Court, the Netherlands offered a more basic dis-
tinction: The peace treaty regulations of the settlement of disputes were limitations on
the sovereignty of states to which those states consented. The Mandate System starts from
the opposite point of view; from the functional powers of the organized community of
states in relation to the regulation of the right of self-determination of peoples. 2 Namnibia
Pleadings at 127-28.
60. U.N. CHARTm art. 24, para. 1.
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ample, South Africa's treatment of the Namibian population has trig-
gered a threat to international order: The application of apartheid
and the implementation of the Odendaal plan have angered other
states to the point of endorsing guerrilla groups seeking to liberate
the territory. 1 In this case, the granting of basic human rights to
the Namibian people is a minimum condition for peace.0 2
In such a situation, the offending state cannot limit the Council
by invoking domestic jurisdiction, first, because Article 2(7) of the
Charter has in practice no effect where international peace is threat-
ened, 63 and, second, because the systematic suppression of human
rights violates one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter and
is therefore of international concern. Nor could the state object that
the Charter restricted the Council's authority to a very narrow area
of decision making.6 The Namibia court held that the "only limi-
61. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity proclaims as one of the aims
of the Organization the eradication of "all forms of colonialism" from Africa, O.A.U.
CHARaR art. 2(i)(d), and demands of its members "absolute dedication to the total eman-
cipation of the African territories which are still dependent," O.A.U. CIAMTER art. 3(6).
Despite the hostility of several of the Western powers to the use of force for such pur-
poses, the Assembly recently voted overwhelmingly to recognize the legitimacy of armed
struggle against colonialism. Ninety-nine nations voted to approve the resolution with
only South Africa, Portugal, the United States, Britain, and France opposed. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 5, 1972, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
These same tensions between the Western powers and the Communist and Third World
states came to the fore during the Assembly and Council debates on Namibia. The British
warned the African nations that resolutions without sanctions would be ineffective. 23
U.N. SCOR, 1465th meeting 31 (1968). The French representative went further, con-
demning Res. 2145(XXI) on the ground that it might actually encourage South Africa
to annex the territory. 23 U.N. SCOR, 1465th meeting 46-52 (1968). The African delegates
did not heed the warning. In S.C. Res. 269, 24 U.N. SCOR, 1497th meeting 2 (1969) they
invoked Art. 25 of the Charter, characterized the continued occupation of Namibia as
"aggressive encroachment," and set a time limit for withdrawal. France. the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Finland abstained. During the debates over Res. 276 (1970) in
the following year, Zambia bitterly attacked the Western powers for their economic and
military aid to Sbuth Africa. Their delegate compared the negative attitude of these
states toward issues concerning Southern Africa with the expulsion of Greece from the
Council of Europe by some of these same governments, asking, "is oppression objection-
able only when the victims are of European stock?" By passing Res. 276 the delegates
hoped to break this deadlock, and all the delegates recognized its compromisory nature.
25 U.N. SCOR 1527th meeting 3-10 (1970). Perhaps they heeded the sobering reflection of
Terence of Burundi, president of the Security Council for that month:
I must remind the Council that the United Nations is approaching the age at which
the League of Nations succumbed to the weight of its impotence. "Ihe Security Coun-
cil, which is the equivalent of the Council of the League of Nations ,J could not wish
to be responsible for leading our Organization towards the fate of its predecessor.
Id. at 3 (1970).
62. See Reisman, Responses to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An Appraisal
of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, I DExvER J. 1Nr'L L 29,
40 (1971).
63. See note 2 supra. See also McDougal & Reisman, supra note 47, at 13-19. The
domestic jurisdiction concept has never been an absolute one. See also Advisory Opinion
on Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4.
64. Such a view relies on the wording of Article 24(2) of the Charter.
The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties
are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
The practice of the Council has followed a broader view of its competence. See 2 Rxszn-
TORY OF UNITED NATONS PRACnTCE 19-25 (1955). See also note 59 inra.
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tations [on that authority] are the fundamental principles and pur-
poses found in Chapter I of the Charter." ' ;0 Furthermore, the Council
has the power to bind members of the U.N. to cooperate in enforcing
its decisions.0 6
By contrast, the Charter originally intended to limit the more
representative General Assembly primarily to recommendatory powers.
In the Namibia Opinion, however, the court explicitly held:
[I]t would not be correct to assume that, because the General
Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it
is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the framework
of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have
operative design.
6 7
This is all the court said on the matter, though the statement may
well have momentous consequences for the balance of power between
the organs of the U.N. According to the Opinion, the Assembly "en-
listed the cooperation of the Security Council" after terminating the
Mandate. The Council was called upon to enforce the decision of
the Assembly, not to transform a mere recommendation into a bind-
ing decision. Thus, in this instance, the Assembly's role assumes a
position of at least equal importance to that of the Council.
Formalistic distinctions between recommendations and decisions
are futile.68 The relationship between the Assembly and the Council
has not been static, the former taking on more responsibility as the
latter has failed to promote the aims of the Charter due to the an-
tagonisms between East and West and the continuing use of the
veto. The Uniting for Peace Resolution and the subsequent peace-
keeping operations in Korea, the Middle East, and the Congo pro-
vide the most dramatic examples of the shift of responsibility-a shift
recognized by the International Court. 9 The Assembly is clearly no
65. Namibia at 52. See 2 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 19-25 (1955), on tile
responsibility the Council assumed under the statute of the Free Territory of Trieste.
66. Namibia at 52. The court refused to limit the application of Art. 25 of the Char-
ter, under which Member states "agree to accept and carry out the decisions of tile
Security Council," to enforcement actions under Chapter VII, applying it instead to all
decisions of the Council adopted in accordance with the Charter which tile Council
meant to be determinative. This view conforms both with the placement of the Article
after Art. 24 instead of in Chapter VII, and with the practice of the Council. See Higgins,
The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which U.N. Resolutions Are Binding under Article 25
of the Charter?, 21 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 270 (1972). Concerning the actions taken by the
Council in the Congo operations under Art. 25 without invoking Chapter VII, see L.
GOODICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMON, supra note 31, at 210-11.
67. Namibia at 50.
68. J. CASTANEDA, supra note 40. See also M. VHITEMAN, 13 DImST OF INT'L L. 527-86
(1968).
69. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151
[hereinafter cited as Expenses Case].
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longer "the ears and eyes and mouth of the Organization but not the
Hands." 7
0
There are, however, checks on the transfer of power from the
Council. The refusal of the Soviet Union and France to adhere to
the Expenses Opinion, which gave the Assembly the power to ap-
portion the costs of the peacekeeping operations among the members,
and the acquiescence of the United States in this refusal, demon-
strates that such transfers will be impossible without the support
of the major powers.
1
The above analysis illustrates the dynamics of the international de-
cision making process. A series of Assembly resolutions can create
the expectation that they represent the normative standard to be fol-
lowed. During the 1960s, such expectations were engendered among
effective elites as to the resolutions concerning self-determination.
Government officials, revolutionary leaders, and scholars came to jus-
tify their policies in terms of the Assembly's current definition of
self-determination: the right to independence from colonial rule. A
uniform pattern developed which raised these resolutions to the level
of prescriptions; the general policy advocated was crystallized in con-
tinuing community expectations. In this sense, the pronouncements
of the Assembly on self-determination became authoritative.
But not every recommendation is prescriptive. Decision-makers
often misread the expectations of the community. Such was the after-
math of the Expenses case. Several major participants refused to rec-
ognize the authoritative voice of the Assembly, forcing a reassessment
of the initial resolutions.
Perhaps the best judicial statement on the complex nature of
Assembly recommendations is that of Judge Lauterpacht in the Voting
Procedures case. He refused to accept the view that such recommen-
dations have no significance whatever and placed a good faith re-
quirement on all members to adhere to them.
[A] State may not be acting illegally by declining to act upon a
recommendation or series of recommendations on the same sub-
ject. But in doing so it acts at its peril when a point is reached
when the cumulative effect of the persistent disregard of the
articulate opinion of the Organization is such as to foster the
70. L. GOODRICH & E. HAmtBRO, CHAaTER OF THE UNrrED NATIONS 95 (1946).
71. Another Opinion of the ICJ, Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admissions of
a State to Membership in the United Nations, [1948] I.C.J. 57 [hereinafter cited as
Admissions Case], was ignored when the "package deal" resulted in the admission of
many states to the United Nations without regard to the criteria set out in Article 4
of the Charter.
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conviction that the State in question has become guilty of dis-
loyalty to the Principles and Purposes of the Charter. Thus an
Administering State which consistently sets itself above the sol-
emnly and repeatedly expressed judgment of the Organization
.. . may find that it has overstepped the imperceptible line be-
tween impropriety and illegality, between discretion and arbi-
trariness, between the exercise of the legal right to disregard the
recommendation and the abuse of that right, and that it has
exposed itself to consequences legitimately following as a legal
sanction.72
Thus, in certain contexts a resolution or series of resolutions assumes
a prescriptive or quasi-legislative role by generating a consensus that
it constitutes a source of law binding on all parties.73 The termination
of South Africa's Mandate binds all states because it is based on a
consensus achieved over time that the Assembly has the authority
to decide that South Africa has violated its obligation to ensure the
Namibian people the opportunity to exercise the right of self-deter-
mination.
Not all the judges on the Namibia court agreed to so broad a view
of the Assembly's competence. 74 Some sought to limit its author-
ity to matters concerning the Mandate System. Thus, Judge Dillard,
in his separate Opinion, offers two alternative explanations for the
court's statement on the authority of the Assembly. The first stresses
that the termination of the Mandate reposes in one of the limited
areas in which the Assembly has decision-making competence, an area
that is sui generis. As Dillard notes, this approach bases termination
on the special powers granted under the Mandate Agreement rather
than in the Assembly's general powers under the Charter.75 The As-
72. Voting Procedures Opinion at 120.
73. Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions,
63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1969); R. HIGGINS, supra note 33, at 1-10.
74. For articles taking a traditional approach to the Namibia Opinion, see Lissltzyn,
International Law and the Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 50
(1972); Rovine, The World Court Opinion on Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TPANSNAT'L L. 203
(1972). Even Lissitzyn, however, recognized the importance of self-dctermination and the
Assembly's authoritative role in this area. Lissitzyn, supra, at 58, 66. The article most
critical of the Namibia Opinion is Acheson & Marshall, Applying Dr. Johnson's Advice, 11
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193 (1972). These two commentators support South Africa's
claims on naked power concepts alone and ignore modern developments in international
law.
75. Namibia at 163-64. See also the Declaration of Zafrulla Kahn, id. at 61, who
believed that the Assembly's powers were greater under the Mandate Agreement than
under the Charter. This presupposes a static view of the interpretation of a constituent
instrument. For a more dynamic view, see Admissions Case at 68-71 (Alverez, J.), Expenses
Case at 186-87 (Spender, J.); Rosenne, Is the Constitution of an International Organization
an International Treaty?, 12 COMUNICAZIONI E. STUDI 23, 50-80 (1966). Cf. VIENNA CON-
VENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES art. 5.
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sembly has a right of revocation because of South Africa's refusal to
submit reports to the Assembly, a material breach of a treaty in force.
Alternatively, Dillard suggests that Res. 2145 (XXI) was binding in-
sofar as it constituted the collective will of those who supported it,
but had only recommendatory effect on nonconsenting States. Thus,
although the Assembly could validly terminate the Mandate, it had
no right to force South Africa to withdraw from the territory or to
demand the cooperation of other member states in effecting such a
withdrawal. For this reason, it was necessary for the Security Council
to convert the recommendation into a decision operative against
even nonconsenting states.76
These interpretations ignore the crucial point in the majority's
reasoning. When questions of self-determination come before the
Assembly, it speaks authoritatively, the authority deriving from the
member states who have recognized that the Assembly's resolutions
on self-determination express their own shared expectations. It is in
this context that the court's lengthy statement on the evolution of
the right of self-determination becomes important-it sets the ground-
work for invoking the special responsibility of the world community
as organized in the General Assembly, and gives normative status to
resolutions originally regarded as merely precatory. The court recog-
nizes that the acts of the Assembly since the passage of Resolution
1514(XV) have converted the Charter's general statements on self-
determination from mere expressions of hope to a general right un-
der international law.1 7 The Assembly could terminate the Mandate
due to South Africa's noncompliance with its obligation as a signa-
tory to the Charter to promote self-determination in Namibia.78 Since
the Assembly is merely applying rules of law in this area, no state
may base noncompliance on its abstention or nonmembership.70
There is no doubt that the delegates who passed Res. 2145(XXI)
76. Namibia at 164. Dilard favored the first explanation. Cf. The Written Statement
of the Government of the United States of America, I Namibia Pleadings at 852-71 (10
INT'L LEGAL MATrmIALs 314) (1971). Compare the dissent of Judge Gros in Namibia at
39-40, which is typical of the strict construction that the French give to treaty interpre-
tation and consistent with that nation's position in the Expenses case.
77. See C. PARRY, THE Sou cas AND EvmENcFs OF INTEmNATIONAL LAw 21-22 (1965).
78. See Written Statement by the Netherlands, I Namibia Pleadings at 350-54 (10
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 295, 296-99 (1971)), which gives a modified version of this ap-
proach. There is no problem in this instance of distinguishing between scin and sollen:
what is and what ought to be. As noted in the Expenses case, action of U.N. organs taken
in conformity with the purposes of the Charter are not ultra vires the Organization even
if beyond the competence of the particular organ. The problem is not whether the Assem-
bly had a right to pass Res. 2145(XXI) but only what legal effect should be given to it.
79. For Judge Gros' question on the effects of reservations to Res. 2145(XX1) and the
narrow answer given by the representative of the Secretary General, see I Namnibia Plead-
ings at 479-81.
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felt that the Assembly had the right to revoke the Mandate without
waiting for court or Council action. After the frustrations of the
1966 Judgment, most felt that "it has become urgent that some posi-
tive action be taken within this Organization" and that the Assembly
could terminate the Mandate as it was particularly suited to deal with
such political problems.80 The Zambian representative observed that
"the real issue is moral, humanitarian, and political,"8' and the rep-
resentative from Mali stated that "a nation's future cannot be placed
in the hands of a jurist ... but must depend on political judgment
and choice adopted judiciously .... "82 Others felt that the 1966 Judg-
ment itself stressed the political nature of the problem so heavily
"that even the most scrupulous concern for legal niceties may at
this juncture cede its place to the political wisdom of the majority
of the General Assembly."8 3 Even the delegates not totally satisfied
with the resolution from a technical standpoint voted for it, since
they felt the Assembly had a duty to take some action to alter the
status quo in southern Africa.8 4 The debates thus revealed an aware-
ness of the Assembly's special responsibility to deal with the problem.
By terminating the Mandate, the Assembly continued down the path
chosen in 1960 when it adopted Res. 1514(XV) and asserted its com-
petence to help oppressed people achieve freedom.
III. Ramifications of the General Assembly's Role in Dealing with
Self-Determination
The General Assembly's significant role in the development of
the modem concept of self-determination has thus evolved from that
80. Nigeria, 21 U.N. GAOR, U.N. DOC.A/pv 1429 at 3 (1966) [hereinafter all cites
refer to the twenty-first session of the Assembly and will be cited by meeting numbers
and page]. See also Libya, A/PV 1425 at 8, Ivory Coast, A/PV 1429 at 16. The Soviet
Union reserved para. 3 of the Resolution as it did not feel that South Africa had repudl-
ated the Mandate, but voted for the Resolution on the ground that the "people of the
Territory must be emancipated from South Africa's racist oppression." A/PV 1454 at
28-29. See also A/PV 1425 at 13.
81. A/PV 1425 at 1.
82. A/PV 1433 at 6. See also Greece, A/PV 1425 at 12, A/PV 1454 at 17.
83. Israel A/PV 1459 at 10. See also Yugoslavia, A/1PV 1454 at 14; Somalia, A/PV 1427
at 3.
84. Several states felt that the General Assembly had legal competence to terminate the
Mandate but would have liked judicial clarification. See Belgium, A/PV 1454 at 31,
Canada, A/PV 1433 at 5; New Zealand, A/PV 1439 at 11, 13. Japan, without wishing to
minimize the political aspects involved, felt that many legal questions remained un-
answered, including pacta sunt servanda in relation to the Mandate Agreement, the legal
nature and scope of human rights, and the legal machinery for the succession of the U.N.
to the League of Nations. Japan suggested that the Assembly ask the ICJ for an advisory
Opinion on whether apartheid was contrary to the provisons of the Iandate or Art.
73 of the Charter. Japan, A/1419 at 14-18. See also Netherlands, A/PV 1454 at 9.
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body's expression of anti-colonial views which have come to have
prescriptive authority in the world community. In the future, how-
ever, the problem of self-determination is likely to arise in different
contexts. Secessionist groups have already attempted to carve their
own areas out of existing states. Other groups clamor not for in-
dependence but for some greater role in the body politic. All of these
movements use the term "self-determination" to justify their actions.
The Assembly will have to confront these new developments for
the same reasons that forced it to deal with colonialism: The U.N.
exists to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," to
"reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights," and to "promote
social progress."8 5 If it cannot successfully deal with new situations as
they arise, the U.N. will lose the principal reason for its existence.
There is no reason to limit the applicability of the Assembly's pro-
nouncements on self-determination to the colonial phenomenon.,
That phenomenon encompasses but a small part of the broader goal
of allowing all people the right to determine their own future. The
creative role that lies ahead for the General Assembly involves the
expansion of this right and the determination of its expanded con-
tent. To accomplish this task, the Assembly must develop a greater
sensitivity to the problems of oppressed minorities within the present
state system.87 Such an evolution will undoubtedly evoke strong op-
position.88 In this regard one cannot overemphasize the antithetical
nature of a state-centered system to the development of a homo-
centric one. Self-determination poses great dangers to the state-orient-
85. U.N. CAam preamble.
86. If principles of authority are to control the flow of decision, it is ultimately
essential that they be embedded in the expectations of the effective participants in
the world community. At no time can it be taken for granted that human expec.
tations . . . are unchanging. Nor can it be validly asserted, without appropriate
verification, that the words of treaties or other written documents mirror community
expectations. Since viewpoints are in flux, today's structure of expectation is open
to change, and in fact is found to change, as new conditions arise and new sug-
gestions are put forward and assimilated.
M. McDOUGAL, H. LAssW.L & I. VLAsic, supra note 3, at 146. 0
87. See Houbem, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, 61 Ams. J. INr' L. 703, 724-25 (1967). In 1961, during a debate
over the question of Tibet, the representative of the then Federation of Mala)a showed
that there was a realization of this broader concept of self-determination:
When we raise our voice against colonialism and violation of human rights in
Africa, we are not doing so simply because the victims are Africans and the oppressors
are the western colonial powers, but basically because these are questions involving
the domination and suppression of man by man.
16 U.N. GAOR Doc. A/PV1084 at 146 (1961). See also the speech of the U.S. representa-
tive in this same debate, linking self-determination and human rights. Id. at 1123.
88. The unwillingness of the Assembly to alter the present state s)stem is demonstrated
by the harsh attitude taken toward India for its invasion of East Pakistan, despite the
plight of the Bengali people.
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ed status quo, and the decisions of the Assembly in the next few years
will most likely reflect a determination to preserve the state system
in its present form.89
But this should not necessarily give rise to despair. There appears
to be an increasing awareness of the necessity for establishing basic
standards of human rights to ensure a stable system in which inter-
national peace is possible.0° At the moment, self-determination seems
limited to colonial peoples and to those groups who succeed by
force in separating themselves from their parent states: Bangla Desh
achieves recognition as a new nation, while Biafra is reabsorbed into
Nigeria. New groups, however, continue to emerge and demand recog-
nition from the world community. Not all of these deserve recogni-
tion, nor does self-determination necessarily involve the atomization
of states. The Assembly will have to evolve rational criteria for de-
termining the rights of each group in the context of the goals of
the entire community, 1 most notably the maximization of human
dignity. 2 In implementing these goals, the Assembly can select from
a variety of techniques. In one instance, it may call for greater eco-
nomic equality or more political participation. In another, it might
89. Even in the Soviet Union, new voices in favor of human rights are being heard.
In his Nobel Lecture, Soviet novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn criticized the performance
of the U.N. in promoting human rights:
It is not a U.N. Organization but a United Governments' Organization in which
governments freely elected are equated with those which have imposed themselves
by force, which seized power by force of arms. With self-seeking partiality the major-
ity in U.N.O. concerns itself jealously for the freedom of certain peoples and leaves
that of others in a state of neglect. By an obsequious vote it has rjected considera-
tion of private complaints-the groans, the cries, the prayers of isolated little people
who are merely people. To such a great organization these are merely insects. 1 he
U.N. has never tried to make obligatory for governments as a condition of their
membership the best document of its 25 years-the Declaration of Human Rights-
and thus, it has consigned the little people to the will of governments they did not
elect.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1972, at 33, col. 3.
90. Solzhenitsyn also maintained that:
no such thing as internal affairs remains on our earth. And the only salvation of
humanity lies in everyone concerning himself with everything everywhere: the peo-
o ples of the East cannot be totally indifferent to what takes place in the West; and
the peoples of the West cannot be totally indifferent to what takes place in the East.
Id. at 33, col. 4. See also E. Lauterpacht, supra note 1, at 270-71; Reisman, supra note 62.
91. The inadequacy of the present definition of self-determination is demonstrated by
U. UMOZUsuKE, supra note 6, at ch. 8. Especially unhelpful are preconditions that are
applied mechanically, without looking to the context. Those guilty of this include R.
HIGGINS, supra note 33, at 105; Bowett, Self-Determination and Political Right in De-
veloping Countries, Am.. SOC. INT'L L. 129, 131 (1966).
92. See M. McDOUGAL & AssocIATEs, STUDmS IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 987 (1960):
By an international law of human dignity I mean the process of authoritative decision
of a world public order in which values are shaped and shared more by persuasion
than by coercion, and which seeks to promote the greatest production and widest pos-
sible sharing, without discrimination irrelevant to merit, of all values among all
human beings.
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set up a plebiscite. 93 In still a third, it could demand the withdrawal
of a foreign occupier, as it has done in the Namibia situation.94
Events will force the world community to deal with these prob-
lems, just as events have forced a recognition of the right of colonial
peoples to independence. The Assembly already has the authority
to deal with the problems of self-determination; the fact that until
now it has concerned itself with only a small part of these problems
merely demonstrates that the colonial territories have been the areas
where the crisis has been most acute. As the focus of the problems
shifts, so must the concern of the organized world community.
If the Assembly can effectively deal with these new problems as
they arise, its concern with the establishment of rational criteria for
the right of self-determination should cause great changes in the
structure of the U.N. and the principles of international law. Two
of these should be briefly mentioned, though one must remember
that they are long-term projections. The justification for some op-
timism lies in the necessity for the organized world community to deal
with broad issues of human rights in order to survive.
A. Increased Power Sharing Within the United Nations
The involvement of the Assembly with broad questions of self-
determination and the evolution of standards to deal with these ques.
tions may well change the entire nature of the U.N. At the moment,
most states use the Assembly podium primarily for propaganda, real-
izing that in most situations the U.N. is impotent and cannot affect
world order. On matters of self-determination and human rights, how-
ever, the Assembly can and has acted as the moral conscience of
the world community. Indeed, that was the role it assumed in the
early Sixties in dealing with the colonial phenomena: It succeeded in
transforming inchoate principles into normative rights by both en-
lightening and exerting pressure on major decision-makers; it con-
93. A plebiscite has been suggested as appropriate for dealing with Formosa. Chen &
Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81 YAIE UJ. 599 (1972).
Plebiscites, however, are open to abuse. The Namibia Court rejected South Africa's re-
quest for a plebiscite in South West Africa even though on the surface it would appear an
eminently reasonable way to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. However, in a
police state where the machinery of control is geared to maintain white supremacy, it
can serve no useful purpose. Even without the actual use of terror it would be impossible
to erase the fears of people who have been under colonial domination for so long. See
F. FANON, BL-CK SKIs, %VWnriE MAsKs (1967); F. FANoN, Tim W.Ercnun oF nm EARni
(1966).
94. U. UmozuvuKE, supra note 6, at ch. 10, notes several arenas in which non-colonial-
ist claims for self-determination are being made, including Somalia, Kashmir, and Naga-
land; and diverse peoples claiming this right, including Soviet Jews, French Canadians,
and Catholics in Northern Ireland.
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vinced them that their interests would be best served by ending co-
lonial rule. In dealing with expanded concepts of human rights, much
the same process must occur-convincing recalcitrant elites that na-
tional and international interests are best served by maximizing hu-
man dignity. This does not mean, however, that powerful states will
fall captive to the smaller nations which now command a majority
of the Assembly's votes. As in any parliamentary system, some will
naturally exert greater influence than others.
B. The Involvement of the Individual
Since World War II, there has been a tremendous growth in the
participation of the individual in international law. At one end of
the spectrum, governments put individuals on trial at Nuremburg
for crimes against humanity. At the other, individuals bring their
states to the European Commission on Human Rights for violations
of the basic standards of decency that a state must afford its citizens.
However, presently individuals may not appear as parties before
the International Court nor may they address the major political
organs of the U.N. If the U.N. attempts to deal with secessionist
groups or with oppressed minorities, it should allow these groups
to voice their grievances. This means moving away from a state-
centered system which allows only the government to speak for its
citizens. Due to the growing importance of human rights in the law,
this process has already begun.95
It is Utopian to believe that a state will, stand by and let other
states turn over part of its territory to a rebellious group; but if the
Assembly successfully evolves prescriptions so that these problems
could be handled in their early stages, this extreme situation would
rarely arise. The maximization of human dignity would obviate the
desire to revolt in many instances. Of course, this is a lengthy process
entailing an intense program of convincing state elites that allowing
maximum group differentiation and participation will work to their
advantage. One must expect some frustration, but the first step must
involve the recognition of the primary importance of the individual
in international law. Without such a recognition, it will be impos-
sible to deal with the problems of self-determination that appear
in the world today.
95. On a regional level, the European Commission on Human Rights receives petitions
from individuals. In the U.N. several Committees also hear grievances of individuals.
Recently, for the first time, a leader of a liberation army was accorded observer status
at the United Nations by the Committee on Trusts and Nonselfgoverning Territories.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1972, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
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